**MEMORANDUM** 



#### THE WHITE HOUSE

WASHINGTON

March 5, 1977

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MEMORANDUM FOR:

THE PRESIDENT

FROM:

ZBIGNIEW BRZEZINSKI

SUBJECT:

Weekly National Security Report #3

## 1. Opinions

Foreign Policy Design. Judging from press reactions -- both domestic and foreign -- there is considerable appreciation of your dedication to more effective and far-reaching strategic arms control; there is awareness of the depth and sincerity of your concern over nuclear proliferation; there is remarkably widespread support for your position on human rights, which has done so much to revarnish America's moral credentials.

Moreover, through the various missions undertaken immediately after the inaugural (to Southern Africa, to the Middle East, to Panama, and to the Aegean) you have signaled clearly that the Administration will be activist, and that you yourself will be in the tradition of those presidents who have exercised a personally active leadership in foreign affairs.

However, I do not believe that at this stage the larger design of what you wish to accomplish has emerged with sufficiently sharp relief. I discern two immediate needs, both of which might well be corrected in your forthcoming foreign policy speech:

- 1. You need to express a more coherent vision of what we aim to accomplish, of what our priorities are, and of how you define the present historical era within which US foreign policy has to be shaped;
- 2. You need to convey to the public your awareness of the complexity of the problems that we confront; disappointments and setbacks are normal in international affairs and accomplishments tend to be the exception. We are setting in motion a process, and the public must be made to understand that the President and his associates understand that the problems we face will be with us for a long time to come, that there will be no easy solutions, and that the effort to build a more cooperative world framework will be tedious, painful, and frequently disappointing.

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I think it is necessary to emphasize these themes especially because we are likely to confront two short-term dangers:

- 1. Given our disagreements with the French and the Germans over nuclear proliferation, and given the likelihood of some bitter disappointments with the British and the French over the Concorde, it is possible that in the short-term our relations with our principal allies may in fact deteriorate. Since this will be coinciding with the forthcoming summit, we should anticipate some rough sailing in alliance relations. This may be unavoidable but it is bound to produce some adverse comments, especially since we have put so much stress on giving priority attention to better relations with our friends. Your critics, both at home and abroad, will certainly emphasize such frictions as evidence of our inability to do what we said we would strive to accomplish. A more specific policy implication of the foregoing might be a more concerted effort on our part to try to minimize the negative fallout from both the nuclear proliferation and the Concorde problems, as well as more stress on those aspects on which we are in fundamental agreement with our allies.
- 2. Secondly, it is likely that in the foreseeable future our negotiations with the Soviets over SALT may prove more rocky and difficult than the public has been led to expect. The Brezhnev response to you might be a foretaste of some very hard bargaining, and it is quite conceivable that our first report to the American people on SALT negotiations will have to emphasize not areas of agreement but the reasons why we have been unable to agree. Indeed, one of the forthcoming paradoxes may be that Paul Warnke before too long will be engaged not in "selling" a SALT agreement to hard-nosed skeptics who will be accusing him of excessive softness, but that he will be justifying to his friends in the arms control community why it was impossible for the United States to accept disadvantageous Soviet terms. Such an ironical twist, incidentally, might make Warnke even more useful than you had expected!

All of the foregoing points to the proposition that the time is now ripe for doing precisely what you have determined to do: to deliver a formal, comprehensive, and systematic speech. In my judgment, it should be short on promises, it should be analytical, and it should seek to integrate the various strands discussed above into a broader approach.

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# 2. Alerts

<u>India.</u> Despite the success of Mrs. Carter's visit to India and the efforts of the Indian Government to improve relations with the U.S. there are some real clouds on the horizon:

- -- One is the issue of whether or not to continue our supply of nuclear fuel to the Indian power reactor at Tarapur. This reactor provides a significant part of the electricity for the Bombay area.
- -- The second is the move to reduce India's share of IDA loans. It currently gets 40 percent; a disproportionate amount compared to other countries but far less than it would be entitled to on a per capita basis. We have also not provided for bilateral assistance to India in the current budget submission.
- -- The third item is the appearance in Indian newspapers of allegations that a very high-level CIA spy ring has been broken up in New Dehli.

Any of these might be manageable on an individual basis, and perhaps all of them can be managed together. But the Indian elections are coming up, political tempers are running high, and the press has virtually a free rein.

Gold Up as Inflation Worries Grow. Early this week gold reached a 15-month high in the London market. This probably reflects both a concern about the inability of the industrialized democracies to hold down their rates of inflation and the large US trade deficit recorded last month. It is not yet a matter of great concern, but does tend to indicate a weakened confidence in the dollar and other currencies.

Bad News from Zaire. The IMF mission to Zaire has concluded that the government of Zaire has failed to live up to its economic stabilization program. The current situation is extremely serious as the trade deficit, budget deficit, and rate of inflation all remain unacceptably high. The government has been shaken up by Mobutu to remove those who "failed to live up to the current stabilization program". The situation bodes ill for stability in Zaire, as criticism of Mobutu's handling of the economy mounts. Political weakness in Kinsasha traditionally leads to growing centrifugal forces in the regions and pressures

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on the unity of the country itself. Mobutu retaining Sambwa (a highly capable financial expert) in his coterie of advisers, however, is a positive sign that he continues to want to improve the situation. The IMF is encouraging him, and his advisers, in the right direction.

European Consultation. The West Germans have made a strong statement to our NATO Ambassador on the need for consultations on SALT prior to Secretary Vance's trip to Moscow. They are concerned that the US is making decisions on issues of direct concern to them (ground-launched cruise missiles, SS-X-20) without prior consultation. We need to decide on the nature and extent of allied consultations to be undertaken prior to Secretary Vance's visit.

The West German example may point to a growing concern in Europe. Europeans are beginning to perceive a gap between our rhetoric about consultation and the fact. The matter of consultation is not an easy one, for how we deal with our European allies may depend on whether we are dealing bilaterally or with the EC, and on how much the Europeans want to hear on specific issues. We need more thought.

on January 12, officials of the Soviet Ministry of Radio Industry (MRP) participated in a civil defense exercise which was designed to test emergency relocation procedures for at least key ministry personnel from MRP headquarters in Moscow.

-- The participating officials drove or were driven from their Moscow offices to a facility approximately 58 kilometers west-southwest of the city.

-- Apparently, the operation did not run as smoothly as planned because there was an unscheduled 15 minute delay in the departure of two groups from the MRP headquarters.

The civil defense issue is likely to remain alive as long as this kind of evidence comes in. Whatever the range of views in the United States, the Soviet leadership must take it seriously if deputy ministers are unwillingly dragged from their offices two blocks from the Kremlin for overnight trips to rural villages.

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### 3. Concerns

Human Rights and AID. We are concerned that the issue of aid and human rights may get out of control next week. Deputy Secretary Christopher will testify on Monday before Humphrey's Subcommittee on Foreign Assistance of the Senate concerning military assistance. We expect him to be pressured on the Philippines and Korea and possibly other countries.

On Tuesday Representative Reuss will begin hearings on our multilateral aid. He will be pressing for a commitment to use our influence in the Inter-American Development Bank, World Bank and possibly the IMF to shut down <u>economic development</u> assistance to human rights violators. He is expected to specifically attack a paper mill project in Argentina (we cut our <u>military</u> sales credits to Argentina as a gesture of our concern about human rights in that country).

We have not yet established policy in these areas and we are concerned that the witnesses may be forced by the Congress to make policy ad hoc. This could have far-reaching consequences, not only with countries with whom we have important security relationships but also for the basic concept of multilateral assistance.

Efforts to use multilateral institutions in the human rights field have many pitfalls. Such a highly interventionist approach is directly contrary to the reason we have supported multilateral aid -- in order to insulate economic development from politics. The less developed countries will react negatively. For example, countries that despise the regime in Chile nonetheless opposed our efforts to use the Inter-American Development Bank to bring pressure on the Chilean government.

Finally there is a serious conflict of values. Do we deprive people of jobs and economic progress because their governments suppress human rights?

We need time to sort these issues out. I will be sending you a PRM for your signature next week on the overall subject of human rights. I believe Administration witnesses should be instructed to inform the Congress that you have directed an urgent study of actions we can take in the field of human rights and ask for time before having to take a position on how and whether various assistance instruments might be employed by this Administration.

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On a separate point, your desire for a modest increase in US economic assistance is running into problems on the Hill. You may want to use your Cabinet and Leadership meetings next week to emphasize your support of this program. Frank Moore supports this idea.

### 4. Reactions

Human Rights. Bukovsky's courtesy call at the White House received front-page and prominent inside-page coverage overseas. Accounts in West European newspapers carefully detailed that photographs were permitted only with Mr. Mondale and that you limited your time to the Soviet dissident to ten minutes. In Paris, Le Figaro referred to the "skillful protocol adopted" which, it said, was "obviously intended to humor Moscow." France-Soir quoted the President as telling Bukovsky that he would defend human rights "not only in the USSR but in the whole world." The Times of London reported that "the impact of the occasion was indisputably diluted, doubtless by direct Presidential order." Coverage in the Italian press appeared to be somewhat more dramatic than elsewhere but did not vary much in substance from treatment in other European countries.

Notwithstanding the Bukovsky visit, the foreign press played the human rights issue as definitely broadened in focus beyond the Soviet Union. It is not clear where this feeling comes from, since, in fact nearly every statement has dealt with the Soviet Union, but the reaction is very helpful indeed--"Carter has hoisted the flag of human rights. His involvement is not selective or accidental. It is general and indivisible and applies to all continents and political systems...."(Bonner Rundschau, Bonn) "he intended to keep speaking out against violations of human rights wherever they occurred in the world" (London's Daily Telegraph).

Japan: "High-Risk Presidency". Tokyo's influential Sankei published an editorial evaluation of the Carter Administration's first month in office. Noting that although "boldness and danger live together," it said that both the domestic and foreign policies of the new President have been marked by an "astonishing dynamism" which raises doubts about a tendency toward an excessive idealism unlikely to mesh with reality, unlikely to produce practical results. Some Americans are, therefore, calling Jimmy Carter's a "high-risk Presidency."